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ABSTRACT: The article is focused on the set of mass protest meetings in 
Russia in 2011-12s, which led to substantial shifts in its political system. 
To understand the case, the article analyzes the changes in international and 
domestic contexts. An analysis of global and national contexts of these 
meetings-turned-movements, their values and goals, disposition of forces, 
and phases of its development the author came to the following conclu-
sions: (1) contemporary Russian society is split into numerous  adversarial 
groups: the central vs. the provincial; the ‘new middle-class’, a challenger 
of the above changes, vs. the adherents of stability; the TV-people vs. the 
internet-people; the internationalists vs. the patriots; the radical patriots vs. 
the responsible nationalists; (2) a network-based protest movements are be-
ing rapidly formed nationwide; (3) in their efforts to spearhead these 
movements the old-model democratic oppositionists fall behind the net-
work leaders both ideologically and tactically; (4) the government is step-
ping up pressure on the opposition forces, while the changes in the political 
system it offers are more of cosmetic character; (5) the emergent ‘new 
middle-class’ is yet too small and politically immature to initiate the over-
coming of fundamental duality in the historical evolution of Russian soci-
ety: a modernization breakthrough – a slow and painful retreat – a new 
head start. 
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. What it was and what has been at stake? 
In October 2011 — May 2012, for the first time after perestroika (ie 
after 1985-91s) Russia was embraced with mass protest meetings. Having 
begun as civic protest, they quickly acquired a political character. A real po-
litical opposition has emerged and has got access to political arena. It has 
been a serious challenge to existing political regime. From the bird-view, it 
was a set of mass protest meetings across the country against the unfair cam-
paign of parliamentary and presidential elections lasted almost half-a-year. 
But it is rather superficial and one-sided view. Actually, we were dealt with 
a highly transformative systemic phenomenon with changing aims and forms 
of collective action. It began long before the first mass protest meeting and 
still not ended. Initially, the mistrust to the existing electoral procedures has 
been at stake. This mistrust grew gradually, expressing itself in local protest 
actions, mobilisation of already existing social movements, first of all human 
rights movement. But this cycle of protest actions had not been a movement 
in a strict sense of the word (with clear-cut goals, written programs, etc.). 
Rather, it had been a mass resistance movement which was very diverse in 
ideology and action repertoire, but united by the said mistrust. This mistrust 
may have open (petitions, marches, rallies) or overt forms (protest voting or 
rejection from it at all). Nowadays, when the above electoral cycle was over, 
and new president and parliament (the State Duma) initiated some steps to-
ward more democratic political system, the protest cycle seems ended as 
well. But the sharp feeling of injustice has remained. The Solzhenitsyn’s 
ethical imperative ‘To live without lie’ come to the forefront. It means that 
mistrust to the basic principles of existing political system still remained and 
it would engender new forms of opposition’s activity. Naturally, every next 
protest meeting generated the new form of the state response. Therefore, we 
were actually dealing with the developmental process of struggle between 
the state and pro-Kremlin movements, on the one hand, and their political 
opposition, on the other. In one way or another, a reform of Russian political 
system is at stake.   
  
2. A ‘new middle-class’ as the collective actor and its constituency  
The period of 2000s was the time of intensive empirical study of the 
processes of social stratification in Russia and in particular of the evolution 
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of a middle-class (Anikin, 2009; Golenkova, Igitkhanan and Orekhova, 
2010; Golovlyanitsyna, 2009; Gorskov, 2011, 2012; Lapin, 2011; 
Tichonova, 2007; Tichonova and Mareeva, 2009; Yavlinsky and Kosmynin, 
2011). Basing on these works, I define a ‘new middle-class’ as a part of Rus-
sian middle-class which is engaged in the sphere of informational production 
and, accordingly, is actively embedded in various social networks and net-
work communities. I attribute to this class those involved in innovational 
practices, ie those who is capable to take decisions and to assume the re-
sponsibility for them; those who prepared to creative activity beyond the 
prescribed norms and procedures. The crucial point is that the expectations 
of this class could not be met by existing regime.  
‘New middle-class’ is mostly represented by young people (20-35 
years old), who lived in Moscow and some largest cities of Russia. As a rule, 
they grew in families in which both parents have a higher education. Mem-
bers of this class are engaged in science, education, private business or in 
various NGOs, though this fact is usually missed by the majority of re-
searches of social stratification. But this is a principled fact because in the 
cases of social conflicts these NGOs are often transformed into the SMOs, 
that is, into the nuclei of protest movements. Among the meeting attendants 
one could observe a lot of liberal professionals. It is indicative that nearly a 
half of the ‘new middle-class’ were jobless or were forced to became blue-
color workers during the crisis of 2008-09s. These people are politically ac-
tive because have a risk to repeat this sad experience of ’downshifting’ in the 
run of forthcoming economic crisis. They are politically active for the reason 
that their satisfaction in their labor and quality of life are the lowest among 
all categories of modernizing countries in the world (Lapin, 2011).  
It is necessary to distinguish this ‘new middle class’ from another 
new specific middle-class which shaped in 1990s at the expense of extra-
income from the selling of natural resources. This class is a kind of service-
class subjected to the ruling elite (Yavlinsky and Kosmynin, 2011).    
 
3. Shifts in national and global contexts 
The said mistrust is both tightly bound with turbulent context, na-
tional and global. The looming second wave of the economic crisis; entry 
into the WTO, which is fraught with complete conversion of a good many 
branches of economy; the volatility of exchange rates and other uncertainties 
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in economic sphere. The situation at the world political arena is not promis-
ing as well. A series of ‘colour revolutions’ and coups in North Africa and 
ex-Soviet countries as well as the ‘Occupy Wall Street!’ movement still 
troubling the Russian establishment. Next, the growing threat to Russia from 
the south brought about by the anticipated withdrawal of the NATO contin-
gents from Afghanistan; the mounting political frictions with the UNO and 
leading Western powers engendered by Russia’s position in relation to Syria; 
smaller-scale but sensitive frictions with China and Japan. On the whole, the 
geopolitical map of the world into which Russia is embedded, is changing 
actually before our very eyes. Russia is presently holding firm to Europe by 
its ‘oil sleeves’, but for how long? [1]. 
Home affairs are lacking stability too. I spoke about the burden of 
past problems in my previous paper (Yanitsky, 2011). However, during 
the ‘fatty years’, when the working population’s living standards were 
improving and any conflict could be put out using oil dollars, society 
seemed to be more or the less homogenous because the greater majority of 
the people accepted the public contract offered by the government: ‘we 
pay you, and you do not interfere in our affairs’. Besides, the mass media 
had been inculcating an idea upon Russian society that the superrich live 
in a world of their own and all the rest live separately from them. As long 
as the population’s welfare was on the rise, such social order appeared to 
be legitimate and even natural. But the past and forthcoming crises raised 
the degree of public  dissatisfaction: why has it fared ill only with us while 
they fare well as before? Here a great role was played by the proliferation 
of living on credit to which the Russians had been absolutely unprepared 
and because of which a large number of borrowers who lost their money 
and health joined the ranks of those who were socially concerned and irri-
tated. 
In the run of protest actions it is became clear that contemporary 
Russian society has long been split into numerous antagonistic groups: the 
large city’s residents vs. those who lives in the provinces; the ‘new middle 
class’ vs. the adherents of stability; the TV-people vs. the Internet-people; 
the internationalists-democrats vs. the patriots-statists, responsible national-
ists vs. ultra-nationalists, and so on. And each of these groups has serious 
claims on the government. All in all, Russian society is divided into two 
large groups. The major part of Russian society is budgetniki, ie people who 
lives on salary. Except high-ranked managers, the majority of them are poor, 
ill-educated and immobile workers and civil servants (office employee), who 
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lived in numerous decaying small towns and villages in the depth of the 
country [2]. A subgroup stands close to them is the wasted people: drunk-
ards, drug addicts, spongers, tramps and hobos. The former’s fear of the fu-
ture and the latter’s dissatisfaction with their existence sharpen the general 
feeling of uncertainty. Since they both live under the sign ‘let it not be 
worse’, they are the partisans of the idea of stability. 
In institutional terms, military-industrial complex, oil-gas, and agri-
cultural complexes, regular forces and so called independent trade unions are 
the stronghold of Russian conservators. As Igor Jurgens, the director of the 
Institute of modern development, stated, ‘their <leaders> perceived the very 
word “modernization” as something hateful for them’ (Jurgens, 2012: 13). 
The true ‘new middle class’ is displeased at the absence of social lifts and 
opportunities for opening private businesses, corruption and all-round bu-
reaucratization of social life that hamper their social progress and making a 
decent living in general. The idea of ‘normal life’ and honest labour are ac-
centuated in the political discourse of this advanced group. 
Honest labour is very important notion in Russian culture. From pre-
Soviet times onwards, honest labour meant work in strict accordance with 
particular technological norms and standards, without deception, delays, and 
without all that what might be called a ‘symbolizing work’ (a kind of sym-
bolic behaviour) which today became widespread in Russia. Recently, hon-
est labour practically ceased to be a measure of individual wellbeing and a 
source of public good having been ousted by the practice of goods and bene-
fits distribution by the employers. The whole atmosphere produced by media 
and corrupted business tells to the young people that it is much easier to 
swindle, to steal, to bereave, to catch property belonged to somebody else by 
sheer force even to merry advantageously, etc., than to earn money by honest 
everyday labour. 
 Labour remuneration as an economic category was replaced by 
payment for service and loyalty to the boss or political regime, that is, by a 
political category, and at the same time made into a criterion of promotion 
up the social ladder. This shift also entailed gradual cancellation of eco-
nomic and social remunerations for past employment. Honest labour as a 
pledge of social recognition and promotion up the social ladder shrank to the 
minimum which produced an additional source of dissatisfaction and irrita-
tion.  
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Inadequate performance of the labour institution and its derivates 
(trade unions, technical safety services) is to a great extent accountable for 
the accumulation of social unrest and psychological tension. The growing 
number of accidents and disasters, non-motivated acts of violence and mur-
ders, large-scale adulteration of foodstuffs and drugs, and, what is most im-
portant, the endless chain of fraud and extortion cases in financial and other 
spheres – all this taken together means that no safe places have been left in 
the everyday life space; there remain only more or less dangerous places. 
Finally, two sociopsychological factors of dissatisfaction should be 
mentioned. The former is that the gestalt of the ‘favourite leader’ shattered 
and even those who loved it got bored with it (Radzichovsky, 2012). Taking 
into consideration the age-old Russian tradition to sacralise supreme author-
ity, its delegitimisation is a very serious destabilizing factor. The latter is 
mistrust again. The government simply stopped paying attention to it. ‘…So 
many stillborn empty slogan-like campaigns have been engineered be the 
rulers over the past decade: “modernisation”, “commercialisation”, “trans-
formation”, “intellectualisation”, “nano-technolisation”’ (Gurevich, 2011: 
16). But How will all this improve people’s sociopsychological well-being 
had not been addressed at all. 
 
 
4. Accumulation of a critical mass of protest 
 
An illusion persisted in Russia that if something had not been shown 
on central TV, it not happened at all. Two events put a stop to wishful think-
ing: forest and peat fires in Central Russia which TV could not keep silent 
about, and arrangement of aid to victims via the Internet, which boosted the 
potency of networking and, what is even more important, imparted a new 
quality to it (Yanitsky, 2011a). The internet has made public the govern-
ment’s incapacity and reluctance to perform its functions. 
And so the protest movement started to expand steadily beginning in 
2010. At first, there emerged small seats of protest, then protestors began to 
unite into regional and local coalitions and, finally, series of mass protest 
meetings combusted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities [3]. 
The general trend: transformation of social, environmental and others civic 
protests into political ones [4]. Another feature: their network affiliation, to 
which the traditional Russian power vertical had been absolutely unprepared. 
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Surprisingly, the ruling party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) practically 
disappeared from the arena of public politics all of a sudden. The feeling of a 
mass of people exclusion was multiply enhanced by the public statement 
concerning exchange of chairs that had been made in advance by the ‘ruling 
tandem’: V.Putin will be president and D.Medvedev will be prime minister 
(what is really happened in May 2012). The people called this deal ‘tiny cas-
tling’. 
An All-Russian Popular Front was urgently set up in parallel with, or 
rather in substitution of, the ruling top that had been moved aside by the rul-
ers themselves. Putin, the acknowledged political leader of the country and 
its new president, headed it and delegated guidance of the ruling party to the 
ex-president D. Medvedev. And the longer the government was irresponsive 
to protestors’ demands, the more explicit and persistent the latter’s political 
demands became. The people came to understand that the state machine had 
fully alienated itself from civil society and lived by its own laws. 
Then, the idea of modernization in Russia had ‘suddenly’ faded 
away somehow and vanished from the front pages of newspapers and TV 
news programmes. The key figures of the Institute of Modern Development 
that had been specially set up to translate this idea into concrete programmes 
and projects of modernization likewise left the public arena. And judging 
from Putin’s pre-election promises what might be expected is just a conser-
vative project of Russia’s modernization (Yanitsky, 2011b). Eventually, 
elections to the VI State Duma (the parliament) held in December 2010, 
which civic organizations appraised as being falsified, topped off formation 
of the critical mass of protest [5; 6]. 
 
5. Models of the mass protest movement 
My further considerations are based on recent work of the US soci-
ologist K. Ash (2011) who analyzed models of protest movements in post-
communist countries. Ash states that in these countries civil society took on 
the role of a challenger to the power of the state and of an imperative for the 
functioning of a democracy. By creating non-state associations civic organi-
zations created the capability to confront and repel the forces of an intrusive 
state. Organizations evolved and built networks with one another, which 
then retained the capability of mobilizing and challenging the policies of a 
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government. This permitted opposition forces to organize and to demonstrate 
their strength during protest cycles (Tarrow, 1995: 54-61). 
Then, Ash distinguishes three modes of interpreting the emergence 
of these movements. The first, advanced most prominently by Valerie 
Bunce, Sharon Wolchik and Mark Beissinger, proposes that the color revolu-
tions spread through a process of diffusion from other successful movements 
in Europe and around the world. These scholars argue that seasoned organiz-
ers from successful movements collaborated with aspiring democratizers in 
unconverted countries to evangelize the ‘electoral model’, or non-violent 
protest against electoral fraud by an incumbent governmentficient in directly 
causing a successful revolution. Instead, scholars such as Lucan Way, attrib-
ute protest revolutions to a breakdown in authoritarian patronage and coer-
cion structures, saying that, ‘regimes with little coercive capacity…have had 
far more difficulty coping with even modest protest.’ Accordingly, it is evi-
dent that only regimes with large financial constraints were overthrown by a 
color revolution and relatively well-financed regimes held on to power and 
survived post-election challenges (Way, 2008). 
A third group of scholars, notes Ash, stress individual motives in 
participating in protests as fundamental to understanding electoral revolu-
tions. This direction can be traced back to analyses of the non-violent pro-
tests that brought about the fall of many communist governments in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. ‘Revolutionary bandwagoning’ was the most influential of 
the individualistic models to explain the rationale for protest. The model 
proposed that each individual in a country had a certain degree of discontent 
with the incumbent government. However, considering the threat of repres-
sion was strong under communism, these individuals had no incentive to dis-
sent unless they felt that their anti-communist principles trumped the conse-
quences of protest. 
All the above three interpretations are applicable, at least partially, to 
the period of mass protests under discussion. The general atmosphere of 
‘colour revolutions’ spreading, the ‘Arab Spring’ in the first place, played a 
mobilizing role here (Korotaev et al., 2011). The ‘Occupy Wall Street!’ 
movement that swept over the USA and EU also produced its effect. The 
second interpretation is true too because the regime has been repressive 
‘point-wise’, that is, only against those who in the opinion of the ruling elite 
posed a direct threat to the regime (like, for instance, the banned National-
Bolshevik party). As to the protest meetings, the authorities tried to hush 
 11 
 
 
them up and even prohibit, but they sprang up over and over again. How-
ever, the third conception appears most adequate to the Russian situation.  
First, for the reason of forced introduction of market economy and 
propagation of liberal ideology Russian society have become highly indi-
vidualized in the last 20 years. Therefore, each individual citizen assesses the 
risk of his/her participation in each of the meetings independently. Second, 
the younger generation of protestors is the strangers to the fear that is still 
lurking in the minds of the older generation. Third, the emotional factor is a 
very strong driver. Russian sociologists seem to have so strong faith in the 
omnipotence of the market and its sociological derivatives, such as ratings, 
ranks and so on, that they come to forget about two more motives and at the 
same time resources of mass protest: moral and emotional. The politically 
engaged experts have got so much accustomed to converting any social act 
into roubles or dollars that they miss the driving force and impact of human 
emotions: resentment, indignation, and anger incurred by the unjust status of 
the majority of the population.  
Not only Russians are discontented though [7]. I think nobody might 
suspect me of calling for levelling but the slogans of today’s protestors in 
Russia and all over the world state clearly: one percent of the population has 
everything and the remaining 99 percent have what is left [8]. Does not what 
is happening today, 25 years after perestroika, mean the onset of a new wave 
of struggle for civil rights, but now on the scale of entire civil society? How-
ever it might be there have been no upheavals on such a scale and calls to 
fight for changes in the current social order over the past quarter of the cen-
tury. And virtual networks act as a powerful multiplier of the feelings of an-
ger and resentment. It became again clear that the principle of social justice 
is an indispensable prerequisite to the formation of a democratic system.  
 
6. Evolution of the protest movement 
Meeting as a mass congregation of people at the moment when some 
critical situation took shape has always occupied a special place in Russia’s 
historical and cultural tradition. In the official Soviet tradition, such event 
was a ‘demonstration’, that is, an organized procession of people [9]. Since 
the events discussed here unfolded in the capital city, the question of where a 
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mass meeting was to be held acquired primary importance and actually trig-
gered conflicts between the authorities and the organizers of any meeting 
[10]. The matter is that Moscow has a ring-radial master plan since the city’s 
foundation, with the Kremlin and Red square in the centre. The Kremlin, 
Red square and the adjoining streets retained their sacral implication in the 
mass consciousness of post-Soviet Russia: the closer to them, the closer to 
the centre (and the symbol) of state power. No wonder the authorities always 
tried to prevail on meeting organizers to hold their meetings in places away 
from the Kremlin [11]. 
The four meetings in Moscow [12] organized by one and the same 
group of opposition politicians under the slogan ‘For Fair Elections’ that 
would be then emulated countrywide marked a new phase of mass protest 
movement. There have been practically no politics in the European under-
standing in Russia in the past decade. ‘The Parliament is not a venue for dis-
cussions,’ declared speaker of the Duma of the previous convocation pub-
licly. The country only had political technologists, administrators and com-
mentators of decisions made ‘at the top’. The politicians whom the incum-
bent government was qualifying for many years as non-system opposition 
were in isolation. Now they joined with a mass of discontent people. It was 
the large attendance at the meetings (‘the digit mean all’ as journalists would 
say later) coupled with discussions in various social and political media, 
publications in the press and in the Internet by the known persons, the ap-
pearance of new public figures on the public arena that signified that Russian 
society ‘had wakened up politically’. 
Why did lots of people come to the meetings? Here are the judge-
ments of independent civic experts. First, the people were disunited (ie indi-
vidualised), they had not gathered together for a long time. Second, the peo-
ple came not only to express their discontent but also to listen and to learn. 
In particular, to hear and understand whether the organizers of a meeting 
were capable of working out any sound program of action at least for the 
moment. Third, the protestors included the people who do not want to emi-
grate, who want to do their job here at home. Fourth, today, as never before, 
it is not so much the result that is important as the process – the process of 
starting to bring in social and political changes. And, as a matter of fact, 
‘those who have not come to Bolotnaya <bog square> missed History. They 
let it pass them’ (Romanova, 2011:3). 
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The protestors’ slogans were: ‘We’ve had enough of you, turn it 
up!’, ‘Russia without oligarchs!’, ‘Putin, go away!’, ‘Return fair elections!’, 
‘Why the Olympiad when we need houses to live in!’, ‘Prague is closer to us 
than Pyongyang’, ‘We’ll come again and there’ll be much more of us!’. 
White ribbons, a symbol of protest movement, were tacked to cars, coats, 
bags, balloons. 
What changes took place in these several months? For one thing, the 
number of participants was gradually growing (the notorious ‘digit’). If the 
first two meetings could be classified as general civic, the third protest fell 
into three different meetings held separately in Moscow, each having its own 
political colouring: democrats, liberal democrats and ultra-liberals together 
with a few representatives of the first-generation Russian dissidents. The au-
thorities’ treatment of the protestors changed too. While the gathering at 
Chistye Prudy boulevard was tightly controlled by the police, the meeting on 
prospekt akademika Sakharova and the next meeting on Bolotnaya square 
went on smoothly, the order being maintained jointly by meeting organizers 
and the police. One more important aspect: the progress of protestors’ politi-
cal demands. Starting with the slogan ‘For fair election to the State Duma’ 
the protestors then advanced the slogan ‘For clean and honest living’ and 
laid down a whole package of demands (see Table 1) [13]. After that the or-
ganizing committee of the meetings proposed to create an instrument of pub-
lic control over the conduct of presidential election. A ‘Moscow league of 
voters’ was set up to be followed by similar associations in other Russian 
cities. A coordination committee of these associations was formed soon af-
ter. The committee appealed to the leaders of the Duma parties asking them 
to issue credentials to public watchers permitting them to control the voting 
process and to obtain primary records from the local electoral commissions. 
Last but not least was the use of the Internet as a major instrument of 
mass mobilization and accumulation of resources. All organizational work 
on the preparation and conduct of meetings has been done via the Twitter, 
Facebook, Livejournal, ‘In Contact’ (V kontakte) social networks as well as 
through the sites of social movements and public associations. The public 
‘purse’ of donations for the organization of meetings, including platforms 
mounting and equipment, audio gear, etc. was also created in the Internet 
and was therefore absolutely transparent [14]. 
 
 14 
 
 
7. The problem of a movement leader 
A change in the context implies generational change and, conse-
quently, replacement of movement leaders. There are still a good many poli-
ticians on the national political arena whose leadership mentality practically 
has not altered over the past 25 years. Such mentality is inherent chiefly to 
the communist, liberal democratic and social democratic factions whose 
leaders have been already elected to the new State Duma. One more thing is 
of no less importance: the mentality of leaders of the so-called non-system 
opposition is altering [15], but slower than the changes taking place in soci-
ety required. Democracy is initially a process of learning, and it is an infinite 
process.  
To begin with, the tactics of the leaders of the old political opposi-
tion lagged behind the tactics of the leaders of new, civic opposition, that is, 
network tactics which were practiced by rank-and-file activists. Second, op-
position politicians wanted fair elections, chiefly in order to create equal 
competition positions for all political parties, while network-based organiza-
tions of civil society had been long practicing ‘non-political politics’ (U. 
Beck) resting upon horizontal links. The alternative agenda was worked out 
precisely here. That is why the former’s tactical lagging behind the latter was 
quite logical. The former, the ‘first-wave’ opposition politicians, fought for 
the construction of a fair parliamentary and presidential election mechanism, 
whereas the latter, relying on local protest groups, wanted to create a mecha-
nism of countrywide network pressure on government structures aimed at 
democratization of the whole political system. Third, for the first-wave op-
position politicians, part of whom had already been members of the parlia-
ments of previous convocations, engagement in politics was akin to playing 
a card game: having completed (lost) the first round, let’s start a second one.  
As to maturing ‘network opposition’, the continuity of action was 
crucially important. They had to build up an extra-parliamentary pressure 
continually because this was the only instrument of political struggle avail-
able to them to which the authorities did respond. At the same time, the 
‘network opposition’ opposition was to enlighten and to mobilize their local 
allies and sympathizers. A round table modelled by the Polish Solidarity of 
the 1980s, suggested by some of the first-wave oppositionists and to which 
government representatives consented, would have been a step back since 
the right to draw up an ‘agenda’ belonged to the power elite. Fourth, the em-
ployment of direct democracy methods is probably unavoidable at a certain 
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stage of such struggle. These are not mass protest meetings only but, more 
importantly, structured pressure on all echelons of power. Fifth, the question 
when ‘it is too early’ and when ‘it is too late’ stood prominently in the Rus-
sian political discourse from the early 20th century. This question keeps its 
relevancy today. But another, no less important question, is practically not 
discussed: what political colouring should network power assume? It will be 
democratic, conservative, national-patriotic or some other? In my view, if 
network power establishes itself in the foreseeable future, it will be anything 
but democratic. Because ‘democracy’ in the current Russian version means 
mass top-down organized support to the first candidate to presidency and the 
policy he is going to pursue. 
As to the leaders of the ‘new middle-class’, they want political free-
doms and fair competition, but lack the sense of responsibility and empathy 
to ‘others’ – they are individualists. Neither do they have an ideology of 
their own. This middle class has been formed in consumer society and there-
fore it is alien to Russian culture. There are leaders in fashions, pops, sports 
and glamour life in consumer society, but there are no real political leaders 
because of the absence of competitive environment where they might have 
been raised. The pre-election debates featured on TV looked more like TV 
shows than serious discussions on the political course and social pro-
grammes. The ‘new middle-class’ have not been briefed in democracy and 
do not know what types of democratic leaders come to the fore in the periods 
of political upsurge. Democracy had been proclaimed in Russian Federation 
for more than 25 years on end, but almost all declarations remained on pa-
per.  
On the other hand, the above young people paying short visits to for-
eign countries actually saw only the façade of Western democracy. There 
had been no democratic traditions in tsarist Russia for many centuries except 
for peasant communities perhaps. There may be a long way from the onset 
of de-sacralisation of rulers today to democracy as a fundamental principle 
of social system, an immense distance in fact. There are no new brilliant po-
litical leaders so far. In the opinion of Vladislav Inozemtsev, a leading Rus-
sian political analyst, today’s leader ‘must be not a politician who has 
dropped out of power earlier, but a young agitator who is striving to get 
there… Russia needs its own Vaclav Havel, an unblemished intellectual who 
has never collaborated with the government and has never been drawn in it’ 
(Inozemtsev, 2011: 3). But Russia has no such people – all Russian intellec-
tuals have already been involved in power in one way or another. Finally, in 
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my opinion, democracy as a way of life is closely connected with the quan-
tity and quality of labour of its bearers. The foundations of democracy can-
not be built under conditions of redistributive economy (Bessonova, 2006), 
where the value of the honest labour of creative minority is ignored.  
 
8. The power elite response 
As many democratic observers and organizers of the above protest 
meetings stated, in order to extinguish a protest wave the power elite usual-
ly employed three successful tactics. The first was deception and secrecy. 
The authorities promised the concerned public to investigate the case, to set 
up special commissions (a parliamentary commission of inquiry, in particu-
lar), they invited politically engaged experts, worked in full secrecy and 
many months later said that the protestors had been wrong and they, ie the 
authorities, were right, acting in strict accordance with law. The second tac-
tics aimed at breaking the unity of leading protest forces into numerous 
competing groups. The publicity (glasnost) of all actions of the too adver-
sarial sides could be the only remedy against such tactics (Parchomenko, 
2011). Last but not least was the setting up of the All-Russian popular front 
and formation from it of a mix of counter-movements, rallies and meetings 
in support of the existing political system. 
Theoretically, the authorities could use several strategies to meet the 
protestors’ challenges. First, they could try to guide the process of social 
renovation themselves. But for this they had to leave the cocoon and stop 
shying away from their fellow citizens. Another variant: to get away by 
chucking a few important but not key figures. Plus to mobilize Russian prov-
inces by spreading a myth that the protestors are rich, uppish and fed-up 
people. A more advantageous variant might be leadership of movement to-
ward modernization, but this necessitates a partner-like dialogue with the 
opponents, to which the government is not accustomed yet. Finally, the vari-
ant of ‘tightening the screws’ in the atmosphere of all-out corruption is 
viewed by experts as an unlikely one (Gorbachev and Samarina, 2011: 1, 3). 
What actually happened? At first, the government pretended that 
nothing had happened at all: there had been and would be protests, but the 
government strategy would remain the same notwithstanding. Taking the 
lead of the opposition movement was out of the question. One more princi-
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ple of the power elite is known well: ‘we do not give up our fellows’. There-
fore the protestors’ proposal to remove a few top functionaries had not been 
accepted either. The attempt of Kremlin political technologists to present the 
situation as if mass protests in Moscow had been organized by sated and cor-
rupt bourgeois against labouring and poor provincials appeared to be too 
risky politically for the officials themselves. Neither had the revivification of 
the external enemy image, that is, representation of the opposition as the US 
agent allegedly attempting to trigger a new ‘orange revolution’, brought 
about anything except a chill in the US relations with Russia. 
Then a different instrument, tested more than once, was put into op-
eration: counter-meetings under the slogan ‘We have things we don’t want to 
lose!’ organized by supporters of the present ruling elite. This tactics proved 
effective. Putin’s supporters mobilized not only the forces of the ruling party 
and the All-Russian Popular Front but also huge numbers of population 
groups dependent on the government (ie the abovementioned budgetniki): 
teachers, the medical profession, public service personnel, etc. What was bad 
was that these people were compelled to attend the meetings and rallies 
(sometimes they even had to drive from other towns), and this fact soon be-
came known (Garmazhapova, 2011: 3-7). It was a real shock, for instance, to 
both teachers and students. Nevertheless, the opposition leaders understood 
well that the authorities were able to recruit practically an unlimited number 
of ‘participants’ who would attend such counter-meetings. More than that, 
the new tactics for raising the per cent of pro-Putin votes had been invented 
by Kremlin technologists. It just appeared that there were a lot of plants of 
uninterrupted production cycle whose workers should vote in accordance 
with authorized list of voters at special electoral districts (Mostovszchikov, 
2012). 
After presidential elections campaign it became obvious that: (1) 
there is no changes in power elite. One could observe the exchange of the 
known cadres between new presidential administration and new government. 
The tandem cocoon remained the same; (2) the fact that the prime-minister 
D. Medvedev has become the official leader of the United Russia political 
party whereas the president V.Putin has remained an unofficial leader of All-
Russian popular front pointed out that the tandem would want to construct 
be-party political system as in the US; (3) the process of multiplication of 
protest forms primarily emerged in capitals across the country confirmed the 
idea that capitals still remained the engines of social and political changes in 
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Russia; (4) during the Spring 2012, the protestors showed its flexibility in 
using  various forms of  action repertoire: pickets, meetings, permanent and 
mobile camps, walks along the city’s boulevards with prominent writers, 
artists, painters as well as the counter-claims and litigations. All in all, in this 
period the protest actions embraced more than 30 cities. It is indicative that 
protest organisers in order to avoid clashes with the police used to practice 
carnival form of collective action open to all who wish to join it; (5) but this 
carnivalisation does not mean the decline of self-organisation. On the con-
trary, the new forms of self-organisation mushroomed. Each initiative group 
of the movement developed a particular form of activity ranging from the 
project the ‘Observer’ (of the electoral procedures of the past and forthcom-
ing elections) to protestor’s camps with disputes and lectures and full ser-
vices including voluntary guards. The further the more an internet is used as 
a universal tool (for communication, fundraising, learning by doing, etc.); 
and (6) finally, the leadership of the movement is still an open question. On 
the one hand, the leaders of its radical wing who were sentenced many times 
have authority over a good deal of protestors. On the other hand, the young 
middle-class protestors move forth the leaders from their ranks. They incline 
to support the public figures which offer the concrete, mainly short-term, 
goals and programmes. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The very fact that for the first time after democratic upsurge (ie after 
perestroika) Russia was encumbered with mass protest meetings is rather 
indicative because it has already a set of political consequences. First, it 
means not only that Russian society is politically awakened, but that its con-
fidence in the current political system has been exhausted. It became clear 
that substantial changes in existing political system are at stake.    
Second, the protest mobilization revealed that contemporary Russian 
society is split into numerous antagonistic groups: the centre vs. the prov-
inces; the ‘new middle-class’, a challenger of changes, vs. the adherents of 
stability; the TV-people vs. the Internet-people; the internationalists vs. the 
patriots; the radical patriots vs. the responsible nationalists. It means that 
mobilization has revealed the true disposition of social forces. 
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Thirdly, a new type of oppositional social movement – network-
based – is being rapidly formed nationwide. This movement won a place on 
the political arena. More than that, it institutionalized in the form of new le-
gal political parties; it engendered various forms of civic control over the 
electoral processes at all levels; and initiated the establishment of groups of 
the same control by the internet civic observers. Finally, the protest mobili-
zation and its aftereffects forced the power elite to embark on the way of dia-
logue with opposition. 
Fourthly, while the opposite part having the mighty financial and 
administrative resources at hand it nevertheless was forced to change its po-
sition from ‘full rejection’ to ‘preemption’ and to even the dialog and com-
promises with its adversaries. But to such a dialog when a steering wheel is 
kept in the hands of power elite. 
Anyhow, the burden of the past keeps weighing upon the situation. 
The government is stepping up pressure on the opposition forces, while the 
changes in the political system it offers are not of a strategic character. As to 
the ‘new middle-class’, it is too small and politically immature to initiate 
serious political changes. It is indicative that the mass protest movement un-
der consideration is not homogeneous and linear in character; there is no 
proportionality between its causes and its strength as well. This movement 
has a variety of goals and is heterogeneous as to the social and political forc-
es involved, who act together in a short run only. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that the set of protest waves had united internet-based ‘centre of 
command’. 
What will be happening in the foreseeable future? The opinions of 
Russian analysts differ. Some hold that we shall see ‘retreat and restoration’ 
and ‘tightening of the screws’. Others think that the government will get 
weaker in the next six years, will make some concessions and try to appease 
the people in the habitual way: first give money to the one side, then to the 
other, and so on. Still others believe that Russia is back in February 1917 
politically. All analysts agree that the government will try to fragmentise the 
opposition, while some are sure that the opposition has already divided. In 
my view, a new wave of mass political protest can be provoked only by 
sharp destabilization of the geopolitical situation (landslide of oil prices, in-
ternational sanctions) or the belt-tightening policy, which would hit the 
masses of socially vulnerable population. Then it would be not a protest but 
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rather something akin to a ‘Russian revolt’ [16]. There is a probability of the 
first, and the second, and the third. However, as Russian social historians 
suggested a good while ago, in the longer term of a few decades we shall 
more probably be observing a specifically Russian ‘cycle’, that is, alternate 
motion: a modernization breakthrough – a slow and painful retreat – a new 
head start (Akhiezer, 2006). But such is a picture seen in historical perspec-
tive. As to the people, they ‘have to make existential choice actually every 
single day. They have to survive overcoming apathy – the reaction of the 
collective unconscious to the terrible 20th century,… to go on living and not 
degrading but becoming more sophisticated – that is how the task for the 
Russian intellectual stands today’ (Mirzoev, 2011: 20). 
 
Notes 
1. Most probably, this will not last long. That is why the ideology of 
Eurasian community has been called into play once again by the power elite, 
this time with a definite purpose: to recreate the core of the former Soviet 
Union. ‘In the last months <of 2011 – O.Ya.> Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan achieved considerable progress in the matter of cooperation by signing a 
declaration on Eurasian economic integration’ (Zhiltsov, 2011: 11).  
2. In accordance with some unofficial calculations, there are about 
60 thousand small settlements without population at all.  
3. In this way, large cities confirmed once again their role of politi-
cal and social centres even in the presence of a network community. 
4. During one year the protest environmental movement ‘Save 
Khimky Wood’ in a Moscow suburb turned from a one-point drive for pre-
serving an oak grove into a symbol of movement against the destruction of 
Russian living environment. A. Chirikova, leader of the drive, became one of 
the leaders of the all-Russia movement ‘For Fair Elections’ in December 
2011. One more example: A small volunteer group led by Doctor Liza who 
helped victims of forest and peat fires in 2010 turned into an international 
public charity organization ‘Fair Aid’ in 2011 (http: //doctorliza.ru).  
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5. Novaya Gazeta published letters of students who allegedly had 
been organized and rewarded for voting 12 times for one and the same can-
didate to the State Duma (Garmazhapova, 2011: 3-7). 
6. For the technologies of revealing the scope of falsification and the 
positions of citizens themselves with regard to election stealing see a de-
scription of the ‘Citizen Observer’ project. The author points out in particu-
lar that ‘today, along with the fast growth of the number of new observers, 
the old ones convert, if and when necessary, into legal advisers on election 
disputes’ (Oreshkin, 2012: 8). That is, there happens that about which many 
Western analysts have been writing: the emergence of citizens-experts and 
citizens-advisers is a real way to democratise society (Fisher, 2003). 
7. For instance, how quickly the Americans have forgotten their own 
history. I mean the African Americans struggle for civil rights led by Martin 
Luther King in the 1960s. African Americans attained equal civil rights then 
(Branch, 1999). 
8. The American protestors’ slogan ‘We are 99%’ corresponds to the 
slogan of their Russian counterparts: ‘We are 140%’ meaning that the pro-
testors were expressing the demands of 140 million citizens of the Russian 
Federation. 
9. Protest camps were practised in post-Soviet Russia, but mostly in 
the provinces. Chiefly radical environmentalists and anarchists used this 
form of protest. 
10. Russian law stipulates not announcement-followed but sanction-
followed procedure for holding meetings. It is a quite strict procedure: the 
applicants must notify the authorities in advance about the place, time (from 
– to) and the number of attendants. Violation of any of these requirements 
can entail a fine or administrative arrest of both meeting organizers and at-
tendants who have violated this order. 
11. The tradition of mass action embodying the unity of government 
and people in the communist period was broken in post-Soviet Russia: on 
the Red Square in Moscow (close to the mausoleum with the body of Vladi-
mir Lenin), a skating-rink was arranged, concerts of Russian and visiting pop 
stars, and the like. Political acts were strictly forbidden there. Political events 
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remained to be the prerogative of highly-placed authorities and a source of 
mass consciousness splitting. 
12. Meetings in Moscow were held on Chistye Prudy boulevard 
(November 14, 2011, 35,000-50,000 participants), Bolotnaya square (De-
cember 10, 2011, 35,000-50,000), pospekt akademika Sakharova (December 
24, 2011, 70,000-100,000), a rally in Yakimanka street, then a meeting on 
Bolotnaya square (February 4, 2012, 80,000-120,000 participants), on Push-
kin square (March, 2012, about 15,000), etc.  
13. Later these demands were made more radical: liberation of po-
litical prisoners too, a system political reform, pre-term parliamentary elec-
tion in 1.5 years, pre-term presidential election in 2 years. 
14. This way of gathering donations at once quashed all accusations 
to the effect that mass meetings in Russia had been allegedly inspired by US 
State Department and other foreign sponsors.  
15. The non-system opposition are aggregated political parties and 
movements denied registration by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian 
Federation and therefore unable to take part in the legal political process, 
primarily in elections to the State Duma and other representative government 
bodies.  
16. Such like outburst of protest emotions was caused in its time by 
the Russian Federation Government decision on ‘Monetization of benefits’. 
In the near future, in consequence of Russia joining the WTO mass dismiss-
als are quite probable owing to the closure of uncompetitive industrial enter-
prises and bankruptcy of part of farms.  
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